Eternal Theocracy?
AS IRAN celebrates the 25th anniversary of the revolution that saw the end of the Shah dynasty amid scenes of mass euphoria, the country is in economic, diplomatic and political turmoil.
Despite sitting on 10 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and having more gas than any other country bar Russia, Iran’s GDP per head was 30 percent higher under the Shah, and unemployment is rising relentlessly. The prospect of the conservative Guardian Council stepping down and offering power to the people in a genuinely free and fair election looks unlikely, especially as a third of the original candidates in February’s parliamentary poll were banned from standing. Nearly 130 sitting parliamentarians resigned at the start of February to protest against the barring of more than 3,500 candidates for the elections, which the reformist party originally threatened to boycott. The result was a resounding victory for the conservatives.
There is a strong chance that the parliament’s conservative composition will force current president Khatami to step down, his liberal approach exiting with him. Issa Saharkhiz, editor of the magazine Aftab, told me during the elections that while “other countries in the region are moving towards democracy, we’re moving in the other direction, towards a religious monarchy.”
As old as time
With archaeological finds dating Iran’s first sophisticated agricultural society to six thousand years before the birth of Christ, it is no surprise the country has had a colourful history. Once a major empire in its own right, the ancient nation that was once known as Persia has always held a geopolitical and cultural significance. Despite invasions by Arabs, Seljuk Turks and Mongols, and often subject to the intrigues of larger powers, Iran has managed to reassert a national identity that has developed as a distinct political and cultural entity.
It was under Reza Khan, an Iranian officer of the Persian Cossack Brigade, who seized control of the government in 1921, that Iran began to modernise and secularise its politics. Khan made himself Shah in 1925 and ruled as Reza Shah Pahlavi for almost 16 years, installing the new Pahlavi dynasty.
Iran was a vital link in the Allied supply line to the Soviet Union, and was occupied by the UK-Soviet Union allies in 1941. Soon afterwards, Reza Shah abdicated in favour of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who ruled until 1979.
In 1951, Premier Mohammed Mossadeq, a militant nationalist, forced the parliament to nationalise the British-owned oil industry. Mossadeq was opposed by the Shah and removed, but he quickly returned to power. The Shah fled Iran but returned when supporters staged a coup against Mossadeq in August 1953, resulting in his arrest. In 1961, Iran initiated a series of economic, social, and administrative reforms that became known as the Shah’s White Revolution.
In 1978, domestic turmoil swept the country as a result of religious and political opposition to the Shah’s rule and programmes – especially SAVAK, the despised internal security and intelligence service. In January 1979, the Shah left Iran and died abroad several years after.
A theocratic republic
On February 1, 1979, exiled religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from France to direct a revolution resulting in a new, theocratic republic guided by Islamic principles. Back in Iran after 15 years in exile, he became Iran’s national religious leader. Following Khomeini’s death on June 3, 1989, the Assembly of Experts – an elected body of senior clerics – chose the outgoing president of the Republic, Ali Khamenei, to be his successor as national religious leader.
In August 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaker of the National Assembly, was elected president by an overwhelming majority. His popularity waned during the nineties, and he was succeeded by Mohammed Khatami-Ardakani in 1997. For the past decade, however, popular dissatisfaction with the government, driven by demographic changes, restrictive social policies, and poor economic conditions, has created a powerful and enduring pressure for political reform.
Thus, Iranian society remains divided into urban, market-town, village, and tribal groups. Shi’ite clerics – known as mullahs – dominate politics and nearly all aspects of Iranian life, both urban and rural. After the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979, much of the urban upper class of prominent merchants, industrialists, and professionals, favoured by the former Shah, lost standing and influence to the senior clergy and their supporters. Meanwhile, bazaar merchants, who were allied with the clergy, gained political and economic power.
The internal political struggles have led to unrest, economic disorder, and are exacerbated by unemployment levels in the country which are high for several reasons, such as population growth, the war with Iraq, and shortages of raw materials and trained managers. These problems are compounded by the fact that, despite substantial interdiction efforts, Iran remains a key transhipment point for South-West Asian heroin to Europe. Domestic narcotics consumption remains a persistent problem and Iranian press reports estimate at least two million drug users in the country.
Meanwhile, the country’s foreign relations since the revolution have been tumultuous. As well as its frosty relations with the West, Iran’s relations with many of its Arab neighbours have been strained by Iranian attempts to spread its Islamic revolution. In addition to its eight-year war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, the country backed a plot to overthrow the Bahrain Government in 1981, and then, in 1983, supported Shi’ites who bombed Western embassies in Kuwait.
Tense relations
Unsurprisingly, the Pope used the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Iran in February to call for the protection of human rights in the Islamic republic. He added, however, that the Vatican and the Shi’ite regime share “issues of mutual concern,” and expressed the hope that the two would continue working together “to safeguard the inalienable rights and dignity of the human person.”
In an address to Kamal Kharrazi, Iran’s foreign minister, on 12 February in the Vatican, Pope John Paul called for greater understanding between peoples of different religious and cultural identities. He said their meeting was a sign of the continued co-operation between Iran and the Catholic Church. “I am confident that this spirit of collaboration will continue to grow ever stronger as we address issues of mutual concern to us,” he said.
During a conference to mark the anniversary, archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, the Vatican Secretary for Relations with States, said the Vatican aimed to maintain relations with Iran to promote good relations between believers and cultures and to defend the rights of Catholics who live there. He said some of the problems Catholics experienced included the legal recognition of Church structures; visas for religious personnel; the organisation of pastoral work; and “educational structures and fixed assets, which have been expropriated by Iranian authorities.” But he expressed his hope that continued and open dialogue between the two states would help “guide us toward enhancing our relations and imparting to the Catholic Iranian faithful a feeling that they are real, true and proper citizens of their country.”
The archbishop read a message of greeting from the Pope to President Khatami, which stressed that the objective of all international relations is the affirmation of man’s inalienable rights: justice, freedom, solidarity, social and cultural progress, and peace. “International co-operation must progress on the path of nuclear non-proliferation and the struggle against terrorism,” said the papal message.
Around 16,000 of Iran’s 120,000 Christians are Catholic. Out of a rapidly growing population of 68 million, 89 percent are Shi’ite Muslim and 10 percent are Sunni, the remainder including people of Zoroastrian, Jewish and Bahai traditions. Although Islam is Iran’s official religion, the country’s constitution includes provisions to respect the rights of religious minorities. However, Daryoush Homaiee, a senior producer for BBC’s Persian News Service, told me the minorities did not enjoy equal rights in the country, and were disallowed from holding high-ranking positions in government and other areas of society. Last March, the US State Department designated Iran as a “country of particular concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act, citing severe violations of religious freedom.
Out in the cold
Earlier in February, Iran had dismissed a UN report accusing it of failing to disclose the presence of a radioactive material needed to trigger a nuclear explosion, saying the report was based on a “misunderstanding”. The US has also accused Iran of supporting terrorists and of secretly pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. But Iranian authorities deny the claims and insist their atomic programmes are dedicated to peaceful ends such as generating electricity. Last year, they suspended their uranium development and allowed UN atomic energy experts to inspect their nuclear facilities after nearly 20 years of secrecy about their nuclear programme.
However, Western diplomats have reported that these UN nuclear weapons inspectors found blueprints for an advanced uranium enrichment centrifuge that Tehran had failed to declare while claiming to provide full disclosure on its atomic programme, fuelling renewed US accusations that the country was pursuing nuclear weapons. Iranian officials denied the reports, admitting the country had been involved in research on the radioactive element, polonium, but stopped 13 years ago. A day earlier, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced its inspectors in Iran – searching for evidence of an alleged illegal weapons programme – had found traces of polonium.
In March, Kharrazi said the US was using bullying tactics to force the hand of weapons inspectors, adding that Iran would soon resume its uranium enrichment programme. Though his words suggested a frosting of relations, some Western analysts believe much of Iran’s threatening rhetoric in defending its nuclear programme is aimed at a domestic audience. They argue the confrontational approach comes after the Conservatives’ victory in February’s elections altered the balance of power. In the eyes of ordinary Iranians, the country’s nuclear programme is a source of power and pride, and the Conservatives want to show that they do not bow to outside pressure.
This is not good news for the country’s indigenous Christians. The meagre turnout in the parliamentary polls further weakened the reformist president Khatami and power is likely to remain in the hands of the country’s conservative Guardian Council for the foreseeable future. The prospects of religious freedom in Iran look as bleak as ever.